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Indexed Units of Account:
Theory and Assessment of Historical Experience*
by Robert J. Shiller
Abstract
An indexed unit of account is a money analogue, used to express prices; the unit’s
purchasing power is defined by an index.  Indexed units of account are not true money in
that they are not used as a medium of exchange.  The first successful indexed unit of
account, the Unidad de Fomento (UF) has been used in Chile since 1967, and has been
copied in Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay.  The reasons for creating such units
are discussed from the standpoint of monetary theory.  The experience with such units in
Chile is discussed.  It is argued that important practical problems in implementing indexation
are solved by creating such indexed units of account.  The author advocates creating such
units in other countries, even countries with relatively low rates of inflation such as the
United States, and argues that an alternative definition of the units, relating the units to
measures of income, may also be advantageous.  Ideally, such indexed units of account
might someday be “monetized,” i.e., institutions such as debit cards may be devised to allow
the units to be used for all transactions, so that the role of conventional money might be
reduced to clearing-house functions only.  
Keywords:  Unidad de Fomento, money of account, ghost money, imaginary money, indexation,
monetary theory, escalator clause, cost of living allowance, inflation, consumer price index,
personal income, wage, salary, social security, pension, overlapping generations, Chile.  
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An indexed unit of account, such as the Unidad de Fomento (UF) in Chile, is a money
analogue that can be used to price items for sale or to specify amounts to be repaid in the
future.  While it is in a sense a sort of money, it is not true money since it is not a medium
of exchange, and has no physical embodiment like coins, notes, or reserve balances.  An
exchange rate between the unit and the true money or legal tender, in Chile the peso, is
defined using an index number (such as the consumer price index), and payments are
executed in money.  Thus, the indexed units of account facilitate payments that are tied to
the index number, without being a means of payment.
How can we call the indexed unit of account an analogue of money when it does not
have any physical embodiment?  Money, the textbooks have long said, has three attributes:
it is a medium of exchange, a store of value, and a unit of account.  As a medium of
exchange, it is a physical object or account balance that passes from person to person when
items are bought and sold.  The medium of exchange role of money is very important, since
it prevents the need for ordinary barter, which is an inefficient means of effecting trade since
bartering requires discovering a double coincidence of wants.  The store of value function
of money allows people to store purchasing power between transactions, which is important
too since it allows them to transact more efficiently, even though money is not the primary
medium for long-term storage of value.  This store of value function of money is central to
the “cash-in-advance” theoretical literature in monetary economics.  The third function, the
unit of account, is that prices are quoted in money units.
When there is an indexed unit of account, as with the UF in Chile, there is a separation
of the first two functions and the third.  We may then make a distinction between the “unit
of account” and the “currency” or “legal tender,” or, between the “money of account” and
the “money” (see Keynes, 1930, p. 3).  In Chile, the medium of exchange and the store of
value is the peso (which also partly fills the unit of account function), while there is also
another unit of account, the UF, which is fixed in real terms.  Prices are often quoted in UFs.
I will discuss here the history of and reasons for the use of an indexed unit of account,
and then, later, ask why there might be an advantage to separating the three functions of
money, allowing a unit of account that is not the same as the currency.  I will argue that not
only is the Chilean UF an excellent idea for imitation around the world, but also that another
indexed unit of account, defined in terms of nominal incomes rather than the consumer price
index, should also be created.  Moreover, I will consider whether the indexed units of
account should be “monetized” by creating institutions to allow transactions to be carried
out by reference to the units of account.  With automated debit card, credit card, and
electronic funds transfer systems, it may be possible that all prices can be specified in terms
of indexed units of account, thus in effect indexing all prices.
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Chile’s Unidad de Fomento
The Unidad de Fomento (UF) was introduced in Chile in January 1967 by the
Suprintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras, a government regulatory agency.
As far as I have been able to determine, the UF is the world’s first successful indexed unit
of account.  That is, it is the first time that indexation was achieved by quoting prices in a
money-like unit, rather than relying on an indexation formula.
Chile had issued an earlier unit of account in 1960, the Unidad Reajustable or UR,
which was based both on price and wage indices, but it was not very successful.  The UF
was and is an amount of currency related to the Indice de Precios al Consumidor (IPC), the
consumer price index for Chile.  Originally, the UF was calculated three times a year, and
was calculated monthly between 1975 and 1977, but daily adjustments in the UF have been
made since 1977.  The UF is now a lagged daily interpolation of the monthly consumer price
index.  The formula for computation of the UF on day t is:
where  is the inflation rate for the calendar month preceding the calendar month in which
t falls if t is between day ten and the last day of the month (and d is the number of days in
the calendar month in which t falls), and  is the inflation rate for the second calendar month
before the calendar month in which t falls if t is between day one and day nine of the month
(and d is the number of days in the calendar month before the calendar month in which t
falls).  Since the inflation rate for a calendar month is computed using the consumer price
index for that month and for the preceding month, the UFs within a given calendar month
will depend on the consumer price index for each of the three preceding months (e.g., the
April UFs will depend before April ten on the consumer price index for January and
February, and starting with April ten on the consumer price index for February and March).
The use of the UFs by the public did not become habitual until the early 1980s, about
fifteen years after their introduction, though only a few years after the values were produced
on a daily basis (Levin, 1995).  Now, the UF is widely used in Chile.
Most bank deposits in Chile are 30-day nonindexed deposits or 90-day indexed deposits
whose rates are expressed in terms of the UFs.  Interest rates on the indexed deposits are
expressed as a premium over the UFs.  On maturity, the deposits are converted back to pesos
at the current UF rate.  Because indexed and unindexed bank deposits coexist, one might say
that the Chilean banking system is partially indexed using the UFs.  Deposits denominated
in US dollars are also permitted for maturities over 30 days.  The UF is used in Chile for
nearly all mortgages, car loans, and long-term government securities.  All taxes are
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expressed in UFs.  Pension payments are automatically tied to the UF.  Executive stock
options sometimes have strike prices denominated in UFs.  The UF is widely used for rent
payments.  Alimony and child support payments are often denominated in UFs.  Office
properties for sale are usually quoted in UFs.  Houses for sale are often quoted in UFs,
though pesos are also used.  However, the UF is not so commonly used for selling prices of
automobiles, nor is it used commonly directly as way of setting salaries.  Wages and salaries
are denominated in pesos and only indirectly influenced by the UF, in that the change in the
peso value of the UF is taken into account in wage and salary deliberations.
Historical Antecedents of Indexed Units of Account
While the UF is apparently the first successful unit of account indexed to a true price index,
the use of units of account separate from money has been known for millennia.  Of course,
historically, units of account precede money altogether, at least precedes money as we know
it.  Trade in terms of precious metals themselves, rather than any money, actually preceded
the invention of coinage in the seventh century B.C.  Units of weight, such as the talent or
the shekel, evolved into units of money when coins were minted that had specified relations
to the weight.  But, since governments could not be trusted to maintain the weight of the
coinage, a tradition developed to write contracts in units that did not correspond to any
current coins:
Einaudi (1953, pp. 234–235) wrote:
Today each country has only one monetary unit:  the lira, the franc, mark, pound
sterling, or dollar.  This is the system established by the French assemblies at the
end of the eighteenth century. . . .  Prior to the French Revolution, the monetary
system of most European countries was based on altogether different principles.
Contemporary authors could take these principles for granted and did not have to
explain them to others.  Their strange terminology causes us, who live in another
world, to wander for a while in a dark forest.  By and by, we finally understand the
tacit assumptions of their discourses.  The key, needed to interpret the apparent
confusion of the monetary treatises written prior to the eighteenth century, is the
disjunction between a monetary unit and a standard of value and of deferred pay-
ment and another monetary unit used as a medium of exchange.
In medieval and renaissance times, even contracts that were explicitly written in terms
of units of currency that were currently circulating as coins sometimes were understood to
be executed in terms of some other measure.  For example, in Milan in 1445, a debt of one
florin would not be paid with one of the gold florin coins, but rather in an amount computed
under the assumption that the florin was still worth 384 silver deniers (and not the 768
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deniers that the florin coin was then worth), see Cipolla (1956).
Since there were often no coins currently circulating corresponding to these units, the
actual units of account were often called “imaginary money.” They were also called “moneta
numeraria,” “money of account,”  “ideal money,” “political money,” or “ghost money.”
From the time of Charlemagne, trade and contracts in Europe were substantially based on
the moneta numeraria called the pound, (or equivalently, “livre” or “lira), which was always
worth 20 sous (shillings) and each sou worth 12 deniers (pence), see Einaudi (1953).
Ultimately, the standard of value represented by this system was the silver denarius issued
by Charlemagne in the late eighth century and early ninth centuries, coins that were no
longer circulating, or even seen, later in the middle ages and renaissance.  Charlemagne’s
denarius weighed one 240th of a troy pound, while the earlier Roman denarius had gone
through repeated debasements, and was not a unit of account in medieval or renaissance
times.  Because they are even fractions, the sou (at twelve deniers) and pound were natural
units of account, but Charlemagne never issued coins representing these values.  Actual
exchange was executed in terms of current coinage, which had many names from the realms
that issued them, names such as angels, blanks, crowns, crazies, doblons, dollars, douzains,
ducats, ducatoons, écus, farthings, florins, guilders, louis, moutons, n bles, obols, phillipi,
reals, sovereigns, stivers, and testoons.  Many of each of these would circulate
simultaneously in each country, a situation that would create tremendous confusion if there
were not a standard unit of account.
Aspects of this ancient system did of course continue into the nineteenth century as a
result of efforts of governments to maintain bimetallic standards with fixed exchange rates
between the coins of different metals.  Sometimes this practice would cause the
disappearance from circulation of the coin of lower value, a tendency that is predicted in
Gresham’s Law.  At other times, people began to adopt the convention that only one of the
coins would be the money of account, the other’s price allowed to float against it despite
government proclamations to the contrary, see Rolnick and Weber (1986).
The only aspect of the UF that was really new when it was introduced in 1967,
therefore, is that it was based not on a single commodity but a representative consumer
basket.  This innovation was indeed very significant, since the management of risks is much
better handled in terms of such an index rather than a single good.  It is perhaps not
surprising that the innovation represented by the UF was not adop ed in ancient or medieval
times, despite the apparent simplicity of the idea of index numbers.  There was no published
theory of index numbers, and there was no governmental authority that would plausibly have
attempted to start a new social convention of denominating contracts in terms of such
indexed units.  The advantage of defining contracts in terms of the single commodity, the
precious metal, rather than the currency, was obvious enough to ensure that the practice
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would continue over the centuries, but the next step, the indexed unit of account, was not
at all obvious or easy.
UF Analogues in Other Countries
The European Currency Unit (called ecu) might be regarded as a UF analogue, in that it is
based on a sort of index, an index of currencies.  The ecu, created in 1979, was defined as
a basket of European currencies.  The ecu was regarded as less vulnerable to runaway
inflation than were the individual currencies, since it was in effect a diversified portfolio of
currencies, and partly for this reason a substantial amount of European private long-term
debt was ultimately denominated in ecus, see Bordo and Schwartz (1989).  (A more
important reason for the private use of the ecu may have been circumventing exchange and
capital controls.)  Since the ecu is not based on a broad index of prices, wages or incomes
I would not call it a true indexed unit of account.
There are, however, a number of examples of true indexed units of account outside of
Chile.  While these are not yet as ingrained in their countries’ economies as the UF has been
in Chile, they do represent important beginnings.
Ecuador has in 1993 created a unit of account modeled after the UF.  It is called the
Unidad de Valor Constante (UVC), see Polit (1994).
Mexico has also copied the Chilean UF, creating in 1995 a unit of value called the
Unidad de Inversion (UDI).  The UDIs began at a par of one to one with the peso on April
4, 1995, and the peso value of the UDI increases one to one with consumer inflation.  The
Bank of Mexico publishes the value of the UDI on the 10th and 26th of every month based
on the national consumer price index.  Mexican banks offer UDI-denominated instruments,
and use the interpolated published values of the UDI to make daily advances.
Colombia has also copied the UF, with its unidad de porter adquisitivo constante
(UPAC), or unit of constant purchasing power.  The UPAC is used for mortgage loans and
for financing construction by savings and housing corporations, see Bernardez (1996).
Uruguay also has a unit of account, the Unidad Reajustable (UR), which is used to index
government pension payments and, since 1996, to index government bonds.  The UR is
based on a wage index, rather than a consumer price index; I shall discuss possible
advantages of uch a variation on the UF below.
In Ukraine, starting in 1995, a unit of account called uslovnaya edinitsa (
, conventional unit) or . . has been used.  Prices in stores and houses, cars, and
other items advertised for sale in newspapers have been often denominated in these units.
The units came into use after the government in a period of high inflation in 1995 prohibited
pricing in foreign currencies.  Despite their superficial similarity to the indexed units of
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Latin America, these units, however, are not true indexed units of account.  In fact, the
government does not even decree the definition of the units.  When the unit is used in
ordinary advertisements, as in an advertisement for a home for sale, it is understood to be
just a disguised price in the US dollar.  Other definitions of the unit are, however, also used.
In stores the conversion rate from . . to the currency is posted in the store, and it often
deviates substantially from the dollar exchange rate.
Deindexation
While the Unidad de Fomento is being copied by several countries, at the same time there
is a move today in some Latin American countries to deindex the economy, to reduce or
even eliminate the reliance on indexation schemes.  Now that the inflation rate is down
through most of Latin America, many feel that it is time to return to economic institutions
that are more akin to those in the rest of the world.
Deindexation proposals are not new in Chile.  In 1986, the Pinochet government,
reacting to complaints of debtors such as farmers, aired a proposal to freeze the UF and at
the same time to extend the repayment of debts.  Fortunately, the UF was not frozen, and
such a freezing would have damaged confidence in any future effort to revive the UF.
In the Fall of 1996 Nicolas Eyzaguirre, the director of the Chilean central bank’s
research department, gave a speech in which he questioned whether the widespread use of
the UF indexation system should be reconsidered, as a possible obstacle to low inflation in
the future.  According to Eyzaguirre (La Nacion, 1996), “It is a unique paradox, unlike any
other in the world:  an extremely low inflation rate with all business and financial contracts
protected against inflation.”  In an editorial, the Chilean newspaper La Nacion (1996) said
that:
Indexation emerged in Chile at a time when high inflation rates compelled the
government to adopt precautions in order to strengthen the financial market.  The
situation has changed as all the indicators prove; but the indexation mechanism still
persists and has now become an obstacle to the actual anti-inflationary aims rather
than a palliative.  At any rate, putting an end to indexation is not easy because it has
become indispensable to the way our economy functions.  The economy’s differing
actors have already made contracts based on the system of indexation, contracts
which cannot be modified from one day to the other.  We need to discover ways of
gradually removing the system from our economy. . . .  If we really want to reach
inflation rates of two or three percent, an aim fixed by the Central Bank as ideal,
we are going to have to do away with indexation.
Bankers Trust has issued a report in 1993 asserting that:
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BT concludes that:  Tight monetary policies won’t be enough to cut inflation sig-
nificantly.  The government could instead abolish the Unidad de Fomento (UF) the
unit of measure that sets worker salary expectations and also is applied as a vari-
able index to virtually all mortgages, car loans, and government debt securities.
On August 14, 1997, Carlos Massad, president of the Banco Central de Chile, in a speech
at the Latin American meeting of the Econometric Society in Santiago, expressed the
opinion that the UF should be phased out in a matter of some years.
The Mexican UDIs have already been criticized as being inflationary by spokesmen for
the Mexican Businessmen’s Council (Coparmex) and by the newsletter El Inversionista
Mexicano (EIM), see Levin (1995).
Fortunately, deindexation does not seem likely to involve scrapping the indexed units
of account any time soon.  In Chile, for example, deindexation in the short run may mean
little more than lengthening the maturities of nonindexed debt from very short maturities
today to something intermediate.
Dealing with the Inflationary Bias Due to Indexation
Figure 1 shows a plot of the inflation rate in Chile since 1960.  Point A marks the date 1967,
when the Unidad de Fomento was first introduced.  Point B on the figure marks 1982, when
(roughly speaking) the Unidad de Fomento first became commonplace.  One sees no
evidence that the introduction of the UF has been inflationary.
Still, the concern is legitmate that there may be an inflationary bias in any indexation
scheme for wages and salaries.  When one indexes wages and salaries, one immediately sets
expectations.  In contrast, when wages or salaries are set in currency units, inflation
naturally erodes real buying power.  Thus, the natural base of comparison for wage and
salary changes is one of declining real value.  If indexation causes one to define wages and
salaries in such terms that the base of comparison is constant or growing in real terms, then
worker expectations will tend to be higher.  There may be a vicious cycle, where inflation
expectations yield higher prices and then even higher expectations.  This vicious cycle is
part of the “neo-structuralist” model of inflation in Latin America.
Morandé and Schmidt–Hebbel (1997) conclude that “There is significant evidence for
explicit indexation mechanisms in the behavior of exchange rate depreciation and wage
growth, contributing to large observed inflation inertia.  Jadresic (1997, p. 31) concludes
that “unless the policymaker is firmly committed to maintain low inflation, wage indexation
is likely to increase average inflation.”  However, the inflationary impact of wage indexation
cannot be summarized so simply, since we must ask what is the alternative to indexation of
wages.  Jadresic (1997, p. 31) concludes that “wage indexation can reduce the cost of
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disinflation if the alternative to indexed wage contracts are contracts that specify preset
time-varying wages.”
A basic fact about human behavior that is relevant to understanding the impact of
indexation is that people appear very reluctant to accept a nominal wage cut, see Akerlof,
Dickens and Perry (1996) and Card and Hyslop (1997).  Noone wants to have to admit to
his family that his wage or salary has been cut.  But, economic conditions may necessitate
wage or salary cuts in certain circumstances.  People seem much more willing to accept real
wage cuts that are caused by consumer price inflation that is greater than their wage
increase.  When we introduce indexed units of account for wage and salary contracts we
need some kind of humane face-saving mechanism to allow people to deal better with the
truth about their incomes.
The face-saving mechanism that I propose is an indexed unit of account that has a slight
downward bias, so that over long intervals of time wages or salaries that are constant in
terms of this unit will decline gradually in real terms; this will be made more concrete
below.  In countries like Chile, where deindexation is being discussed, a proposal that is
more constructive than the proposal to abolish the UF might be instead to introduce a second
UF, as an optional alternative to the present one, with a downward bias relative to inflation.
Money Illusion and the Need for Indexed Units of Account
The difference between a government’s promoting indexation (as by setting an example with
indexed government debt) and a government’s establishing an indexed unit of account might
appear to be a very subtle one, little more than a difference in presentation.  Indeed, most
of the world has not paid much attention to the indexed units of account in Chile and
elsewhere.  Even some major surveys about indexation published in Chile seem to pay very
little attention to the UF, see Sáez (1982), Morandé (1996), and Landerretche and Valdés
(1997).
But the difference between an indexed unit of account and a simple indexation scheme
is fundamental.  The difference relates to the way people use money, or, one might say, the
difference relates to the “moneyness” of the indexed units of account.
Simon Newcomb (1879, p. 230) (an astronomer, renowned for establishing a world-wide
unified system of astronomical constants) long ago, criticized economists who argued that
rational people ought to be able to make proper allowances for inflation in their contracts
without any special institutions, and argued that money occupies a special niche in people’s
thinking:
So far as the investigations of Walker and other economists extend, their reasoning
appears to be perfectly sound.  We consider, however, that their results are to a
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certain extent ill founded from the circumstance of their leaving out of sight one
of the most important factors of the problem, namely the effect of changes of the
standard of living producing a universal deception among the community in respect
to the increase or diminution of wealth.  This factor is so important as to need very
close consideration. 
Because of this universal deception, Newcomb (1879, p. 230) argued, people will always
be deceived if their contracts are made in terms of currencies:
All men in this and other countries are accustomed from youth to measure the
increase or diminution of wealth by dollars or other denominations supposed to be
units of value. . . .  Even when the facts are understood, the idea that the change is
in the value of the commodities measured, and not in that of the dollar itself, is so
natural that a long and severe course of mental discipline is necessary to get rid of
it.  Indeed, we question whether the most profound economist can be entirely
successful in this respect.
Newcomb proposed what he called “dollar of uniform value, as measured by the average of
commodities.” He called his proposal a “multiple standard of value” since it is based on a
weighted average price of multiple commodities.  He argued, therefore, that the
conventional unit of account must be replaced by a unit which is tied to an average of prices
of commodities.
Irving Fisher, the most prominent advocate of indexation in the United States, wrote a
book entitled The Money Illusion (1928) about just this inability for people to appreciate the
subtleties of price level movements.  The term “money illusion” has been part of
economists’ vocabulary ever since.  He, like Newcomb, also advocated (1911, 1913a) a
“compensated dollar,” whose purchasing power would be absolutely constant, so that people
would not be hampered by money illusion.
That people do indeed have powerful tendencies to make errors in dealing with inflation,
and that people tend to want to anchor their decisions in terms of currency units, was
carefully documented with experimental research by Shafir, Diamond and Tversky (1997).
They found that people not only make simple mistakes, failing to take account of inflation
in decision making, but also that people seem to behave as if they really have their
preferences in terms of currency units rather than money.  They found, for example, that
people report feeling better off when their wages are increased (in terms of currency) even
if they fully understand that prices have increased just as much.
People have serious problems in learning to adopt indexation schemes.  For example,
efforts to start indexed government debt in moderate inflation countries (the UK, Sweden,
Canada, Australia and the United States) have me with very lukewarm public response, see
Campbell and Shiller (1996).  Even in some high inflation countries there is little public use
11
of indexation.  In Turkey, where inflation rates have been running in the vicinity of 100%
a year for years, and where inflation has not been below 20% a year since the late 1970s,
there is still very little indexation.  In Turkey, government indexed debt was not introduced
successfully until 1996, and even then the amounts are very small.  Private debt is
unindexed, except for some indexed savings accounts created by banks at the urging of the
government.  Remarkably, even alimony and child support payments are usually
denominated in the currency, Turkish Lira, even though the payments are part of schedules
that may last a lifetime.  Obviously, the real value of the payments will be reduced to nearly
zero in only a few years.  (Recipients of these payments regularly apply to the courts for a
modification of the payments, a costly and difficult procedure that raises many painful
issues.)  Why don’t they just index the payment scheme?
I did a study (1997a), involving interviews and questionnaires, to try to learn why people
in both the United States and Turkey are so little interested in indexation.  The results are
complex and hard to describe in a short space, in part because it is not easy to characterize
people’s misunderstanding of economic principles.  Money illusion appears to be an
important factor in reducing interest in indexation.  Many people, rejecting indexation, will
say “I just want to know how much money I will be getting,” as if they regarded money as
an end in itself.  This appears to be pure money illusion, a la Newcomb and Fisher.  Many
people will openly admit, if asked, that they feel better about a pay increase in money terms
even if they fully understand that prices have risen just as much.
My study concluded, however, that more is at work in inhibiting public interest in
indexation than just pure money illusion.  One factor identified in my study of the US and
Turkey is that people have incorrect theories about the correlation of inflation with real
incomes.  There is a widespread belief that inflation coincides with stunning reversals in real
incomes of ordinary people.  The “wage lag hypothesis,” long discredited by economists
(see Alchian and Kessel, 1960), is alive and well in the public imagination.  This is one
reason why alimony and child support payments are usually not indexed in the United States
and Turkey:  people think that if there is a lot of inflation, then an indexed alimony and child
support payer would not be able to keep up with the increased payments.  People also
largely believe that inflation hurts firms’ profits as well.  The idea that effects of
unforecastable inflation are primarily a redistribution between debtors and creditors is not
prominent on their minds.  Inflation is viewed as hurting everybody (see also Shiller,
1997b).
Another important reason why people resist indexation that I uncovered in my study
(1997a) is that people do not appreciate the uncertainty that inflation generates in price
levels at distant dates.  Even in Turkey, where the price level has drifted over orders of
magnitude, people seem not to appreciate the uncertainty about future price levels.  When
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I asked Turkish respondents, on the questionnaire, to give a range in which the Turkish price
level would probably fall in ten years, the median ratio between the high and low limits of
the range was 1.5 to 1.  This must be a grotesque understatement of the uncertainty about
future price levels.  In part, the judgment error probably arises because the media do not
seem to give much attention to the true uncertainty that price levels have over long time
intervals.  In part, this problem probably arises because of a difficulty that the public
apparently has in understanding the power of compounding.  Even in low inflation countries,
people just haven’t thought about how much difference it makes over long time spans if, for
example, we have 2% inflation every year or have 6% inflation every year.  These
differences do not sound like very much, but in fact the difference in real values of fixed
cash payments between these two inflation rates is in the ratio of 1.47 to 1 in ten years and
2.16 to 1 in twenty years.
We see, then, that the indexed units of account, such as the UF in Chile, by becoming
in a sense an analogue of money, solve  deep and ingrained problems that people have in
taking account of the effects of inflation.  These units help promote indexation where it
would not otherwise occur, or where it would occur only haphazardly or incompletely.
Coordination Problems and the Indexed Units of Accounts
The creation by some authority like the government of an indexed unit of account may also
solve a sort of coordination problem that otherwise would inhibit indexation.  A
coordination problem appears when there is some advantage to everyone taking some action
together (like adopting some form of indexation together) but when, taken individually, the
actions are not as beneficial.  If no steps are taken to help people coordinate, then the actions
may never be taken.  Coordination problems are indeed central to monetary theory, indeed,
the medium of exchange function of money itself may be regarded as helping deal with the
coordination problems that would arise when, in a barter economy, people have difficulty
locating a double coincidence of wants.
Coordination problems can be solved by social conventions.  We all drive on the right
side of the road, for example.  It wouldn’t matter if we all drove on the left side of the road,
but it would be a disaster of half of us chose one side and half the other.  Once a social
convention is established, the coordination problem is solved and people have little or no
incentive to change it.
Why don’t people in the US quote prices in CPIs in the absence of any government
initiative to create indexed units of account?  People could name the price of a product as,
say, 10 CPIs, meaning that they will charge in dollars ten times the latest CPI.  The reason
people do not may have to do in part with a coordination problem, of deciding together that
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we will do this.  Until such a decision is made, individuals will not find it in their individual
interest to try to convince people to take the other side of indexed contracts.
Until there is a social convention on how and when to index, people will find it costly
to try to come to an agreement on indexation.  There are many questions.  On what date does
the price change? Which CPI should be used?  (There are many definitions available.)  What
do economists where the CPI is computed think about which unit should be used?  At
present, in countries where no indexed unit of account exists, each person must answer these
questions alone.  It is thus not surprising that there is no tendency to quote prices in “CPIs.”
Another coordination problem is that we must decide, and agree, on a way to smooth
the CPI.  We should not define prices just in terms of the latest CPI because the CPI is
vulnerable to sudden jumps from month to month.  This is particularly true when we are
talking about indexing financial contracts to the CPI.  A unit of account like the UF would
smooth out the CPI movements, otherwise there would be important jumps in deposit
balances on the dates of new announcements of the CPI.  Thus, the smoothing of the CPI in
producing the UF has also been a fundamental part of the functioning of the UF as an
analogue of money.
Why Separate the Unit of Account from Currency?
What is the point of separating the medium and exchange and store of value functions, that
currency has, from the unit of account function that we have in the Unidad de Fomento and
other examples?  Many argue that the reliance on indexed units of account like the UF is
nothing more than a sign of failure to maintain the currency unit in constant buying power,
and that what we really should do is just stop inflation dead.
Irving Fisher (1913a) thought that keeping an indexed unit of account separate from the
medium of exchange would not be sensible partly because of “laborious calculations in
translations from the medium of exchange into the standard of deferred payments and back
again.”  This argument is reminiscent of the arguments made today for the common currency
in Europe, by people who are tired of the currency exchanges that they must make whenever
they cross a border.  Making these exchanges, as also making calculations between the
indexed unit of account and the currency, may seem unnecessarily complicating for our
lives.  It is perhaps for this reason that the UF is not used to quote everyday prices in Chile.
The inconveniences generated by keeping a separate unit of account are not really large.
In this age of computers, the complications created by the need to calculate how many pesos
corresponds to a UF, or the calculations necessary for currency exchanges, can hardly
matter.  Indeed, there will inevitably be a blurring of the distinction between the currency
and the separate unit of account once credit card companies allow charges to be made
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directly in the units of account, and banks allow writing of checks in terms of the units of
account.  (This has not happened yet, as far as I have been able to determine.) 
Still, there are some slight inconveniences to keeping the indexed unit of account
separate from the currency, and so one naturally asks why not merge the two?  Why not just
keep the price level steady?  The problem with this solution is that the history of inflation
around the world does not create any optimism that we could, at least without some kind of
fundamental structural institutional change, really stop inflation dead.  There have been
many times in history when inflation was temporarily stopped, but producing lasting price
stability, over many decades, has proved illusive.  While there have been other schemes
proposed to achieve price stability automatically, notably those of Hall (1983, 1997), there
is no guarantee that such schemes will really succeed fully in their objective.  If these
alternative schemes are not sure to succeed, it may be better for all longer term contracts to
be defined in terms of a unit of account, which is itself a proxy for a price index, so that the
indexation cannot fail.
Simon Newcomb (1879) and Irving Fisher (1911) thought that they had a mechanism
whereby an indexed unit of account could also be a medium of exchange and store of value.
They thought that by defining the currency itself as an indexed unit of account, they could
achieve just this.  In effect, they wanted to print pieces of paper called UF, and use these as
money.
They were writing at the time of the international gold standard.  Any government could
merely promise, they argued, to adjust the quantity of gold in its currency at regular intervals
so that the real buying power of the gold that these currencies represent is kept constant.
This proposal became known, after it was published by Irving Fisher (1913a), as the
compensated dollar plan.
It is apparent, however, that there is a potential difficulty in the government’s efforts to
maintain a compensated dollar.  In order to guarantee that the real buying power of the com-
pensated dollar is really constant, the government must promise to make the currency freely
convertible into gold and back at all times.  The problem then is, as recognized by Irving
Fisher, that speculators might “embarrass” the government by making large trading profits
at the government’s expense.  As Fisher (1913a) pointed out, if the mint price were $18 per
ounce and if it were known that the mint price would shortly be $18.50 per ounce, then
speculators could redeem their dollars into gold and buy back their dollars at $18.50.  If the
buying power of the currency is indeed to be kept steady, then the price index on which it
is based must include the prices of many things that are not traded on speculative markets.
Notably, it must include the price of services.  Any price index that includes these will
almost surely be serially correlated, forecastable into the future.  The government might
possibly, if the buying power of gold falls far enough, find itself obligated to pay out more
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gold than the government has.  Given this possibility, public fears that the compensated
dollar plan may have to be abandoned could force abandonment of the plan.
Fisher’s proposed solution to this problem is that the government would impose a 1%
bid-asked spread when exchanging gold for compensated dollars, and that the maximum
movement of the gold content of the dollar would be 4% per annum.  This would help
prevent speculation, he said.  It would also make the buying power of the dollar
unresponsive to large changes in the price of gold.  Fisher wrote an article (1913b)
presenting simulations with actual historical data 1896–1911 indicating that speculation and
the limit on the change in the gold content would not have been an important problem.  He
points out that so long as the bid-asked spread, brassage charge, exceeds the maximum
allowed monthly change in the gold content of the dollar, there is no riskless arbitrage profit
to be obtained by buying and redeeming dollars over a zero time interval (actually
overnight) at month end.  Any attempt to profit from the predictable changes in the gold
content would then involve some risk, and so presumably such attempts would be limited
in importance.  Still, despite the success of his simulations for that period, the potential
fluctuations in the buying power of gold could be large enough to cause the formula value
of the dollar to fluctuate beyond 4% in a year, and this possibility suggests serious problems
with the compensated dollar plan.  Note, for example, that the buying power of gold doubled
between 1979 and 1980 and then fell nearly back to its 1979 level by 1982.  Fisher’s
simulations do not address the full complexity of the problem of speculation with the
compensated dollar, a problem that involves such things as the simultaneous determination
of the real price of gold and the money supply with public expectations both of future
changes in the gold content of the dollar and of the probability of the event that the
compensated dollar plan will be suspended.
Fisher’s proposals generated much discussion, both among academics and the general
public.  Fisher reports (1914) a list of 344 articles about his idea, many of them critical.  The
story of the campaign for the compensated dollar, or “Fisher plan,” is recounted in Fisher
(1934, Appendix I, pp. 374–389).  He found much opposition to his proposal, apparently
mostly misinformed, but nonetheless effective in preventing serious consideration of his
proposal. He later abandoned the proposal without disavowing it:
I had never believed that the compensated dollar plan was the only possible plan,
nor even ideally the best. . . .  I am therefore still in favor of it for America, as part
of a general plan, although, for simplicity, the method recently adopted in Sweden
(a managed currency independent of gold) seems better. (Fisher 1934, p. 382). 
He seems to have grown tired of his campaign for a compensated dollar, with the difficulty
of convincing the public of its merits, and his attention was distracted by other plans.  The
significant risks of inflation with the new managed currency independent of gold were not
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so apparent at the time as they are now, and so the relative attractiveness of the compensated
dollar plan was not so prominent. 
Fisher’s original plan for a compensated dollar defined in terms of gold might possibly
be workable today, but it seems to involve more uncertainties as to its ultimate success than
there are with the use of indexed units of account.  There is, of course, at this stage in
history, no reason to return now to a monetary system that creates any special function for
gold.  The problems potentially caused by speculation in the currency-gold ratio that Fisher
alluded to are shortcomings of the compensated dollar plan. In the age of computers, there
is not such a problem with keeping the unit of account separate from the medium of
exchange as there was in Fisher’s day.  Given the apparent difficulty of guaranteeing the real
value of currency, contracts can instead be written in terms of price indices themselves, i.e.,
in terms of units of account, leaving the medium of exchange function for conventional
money.
Should There Be Indexed Units of Account Be Settled on Nominal
Income Indexes as Well as on Consumer Price Indexes?
While the Chilean example illustrates the use of only a single indexed unit of account in a
country, there may be reasons to adopt not just one unit of acc unt, but rather multiple units
of account.  I have here in mind especially creating an additional unit of account, beyond
just the CPI-based unit of account, that is related to a measure of national economic
prosperity, such as personal income.
When indexed units of account were first developed in Chile, it was to solve a pressing
problem of high inflation.  At that time, it would not have mattered very much, compared
to the magnitude of the problem of existing nominal contracts, whether the units were
denominated in terms of a consumer price index or in terms of nominal income.  It was
probably natural to create them in the simplest, most direct way possible, so as to facilitate
public acceptance.  Public acceptance of these UFs was not assured (and did not come
immediately).  The concept of the UFs could be explained more easily in terms of a price
index than in terms of nominal income indexes.
But the problems caused by tying the UF to the consumer price index in Chile have not
gone unnoticed.  For example, critics of the UF in Chile have said that the UF causes prob-
lems for mortgage lenders in periods of high inflation, since the UF-denominated mortgages
are adjusted daily, but salaries are denominated in pesos, and are adjusted only annually (see
Bernardez, 1996).
While some appear to think that this problem should be solved by deindexing, this is not
at all a reason to eliminate the indexed units of account.  It is rather a reason to define addi-
1 “Bill Seeks Mortgage Link to Wages, Not Inflation,” Lagniappe Letter, May 3, 1991 (via Latin
American Information Services).
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tional new ones, that are related to income measures.  This has been recognized by some
policymakers.  In fact, in 1960 the Chilean government created an indexed unit of account,
called the Unidad Reajustable (UR) that depended both on wage and price indices, and
although it was apparently not very successful, after 1967 when the UF was created there
were really two indexed units of account simultaneously in use in Chile, both the CPI-based
UF and the wage-CPI based UR.  The Chilean government, moreover, in 1991, drafted a bill
“that would establish a new, optional mechanism for adjusting mortgages by linking them
to wages rather than the inflation rate.”1  While a wage-indexed unit of account never got
far in Chile, a wage-based indexed unit of account, the Unidad Reajustable (UR) was
established in Uruguay and is in use there today.
When we consider indexed units of account in times and places where inflation is
moderate, then the relative importance of getting the index right becomes central.  By
moderate inflation I mean the 1% to 5% inflation that is common in many countries of the
world today, small on a year-to-year basis, but large and variable enough that there remains
substantial uncertainty over longer time intervals.
In an extreme case where the problem of inflation is utterly solved, so that there is never
any inflation at all, we would have no need of indexed units of account tied to inflation
itself.  In this extreme case, however, there may still be a need for indexed units of account
tied to income measures.
The importance of creating an “optional mechanism” for indexing to some income
measure such as wages goes far beyond the issue of mortgage loans.  In fact, creating units
of account tied to some such measures is central to the fundamental problem of individuals’
optimal risk management.
Life Cycle Savings
The overlapping generations model is a useful construct to consider what kind of
intertemporal contracts ought to be made, and how these should be indexed:  this analysis
is inspired by Fischer (1983), Merton (1983), and others.
Let us consider some rudimentary examples.  To simplify exposition, let us suppose that
there is no population growth, so that all generations have the same number of individuals.
Also to keep things as simple as possible, let us represent the population as belonging to
either of only two generations, and that only the young earn income.  Suppose also that the
utility is additively separable, and that future income is uncertain.  Then, utility is:
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U ' u(cy) % u(co)
max
Tt
u(Yt – Tt ) % u(Tt )
Tt ' Yt /(1 %
–1/ )
where cy is real consumption while young and co is real consumption while old, u(@) is an
instantaneous utility (or felicity) function, and  is a discount factor, representing the
subjective time preference that people have.  Suppose also that there is no storage or
investment, and that there is a social planner who wishes to reallocate the income in each
time period between the two generations that are alive at the time.
Since the two generations have the same number of individuals, and since the utility
function is additively separable, the social planner at time t who has just learned what per
capita income yt at time t is, must merely allocate the total income to maximize the utility
function where, however, the consumptions are the consumptions of different people alive
at the same time.  The social planner needs only solve the problem:
where Tt is the transfer from young to old at time t.  The issue is in what way this transfer
depends on Yt.  Let us consider the constant relative risk aversion utility function u(c) =
–c(1– ) that has been widely used in empirical literature as a sensible representation of
people’s utility.  Then the optimal transfer is:
And so, the transfer is directly proportional to income.  This means that the optimal redis-
tribution would be indexed to income (nominal, measured in currency), and not at all to the
consumer price index.  The same redistribution could be achieved in terms of a social
contract in terms of an indexed unit of account that is tied not to the consumer price index
but to total income.  This transfer could be effected if young people buy government bonds
that pay out in units of account indexed to income to save for their retirement, and are at the
same time taxed (credited) by the government for any shortfall (surplus) in making the
transfer to the then old people.  
Table 1 shows, for the above model, the welfare loss, as a fraction of income, that is
effected by indexing the units of account to the consumer price index where feasible, rather
than to income.  Note the words “where feasible.”  In considering any scheme of indexing
payments to the elderly, it must be recognized that in some states of the world it will not be
easy at all, perhaps not even possible, to make the fixed real payment to the elderly, if
national income is not large enough to make the payments.  Indexed social security plans
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Tt ' Yt /2 % ln( )/(2 )
do not actually provide fixed real payments in all states of the world, even if that is what is
promised.  Analyzing such social security plans is a bit like analyzing “fixed” exchange
rates, where we all know that the exchange rates will in fact be changed if extreme
conditions prevail.  For the purpose of constructing Table 1, I assumed that if the fixed real
transfer to the old generation were more than 70% of total income available, that the transfer
would be capped at 70% of total income.
It is assumed for this table that the income of each generation has the same lognormal
distribution with zero mean of log income; values are shown for various assumptions about
the standard deviation of log income.  The table assumes that the transfer made in the con-
sumer price indexed case (so that the real transfer is constant unless it is greater than 70%
of total income) is the optimal one, that maximizes expected utility.  A monte carlo
experiment, with 100,000 iterations, was used to derive the table, since analytical
expressions for the values are not obtainable.
We see from the table, for example, that the welfare loss to fixing the amount
transferred subject to feasibility is about 4% of total income in the case where the standard
deviation is 0.3 (or 30%).  (A standard deviation of 30% for real national income in 30 years
is not an unreasonable estimate of the uncertainty, given evidence on variability of national
incomes, see Shiller, 1993.)  A welfare loss of around 4% indicates a very substantial
advantage to tying payments to income, given the virtually zero cost to creating indexed
units of account allow this to happen.
The above analysis assumes a constant relative risk aversion utility function.  One
might, as an alternative, suppose that the utility function is not of the constant relative risk
aversion variety but is constant absolute risk aversion that is, exponential utility u(c) =
–exp(– c).  Then, in the context of the same model as above, the optimal transfer from
young to old is:
Now, the optimal transfer has both a component indexed to nominal income (whose real
value Yt appears in the first term) and a component indexed to the consumer price index
(whose real value is represented by the second term).  For ‘reasonable’ values of the
parameters and , the first term is likely to dominate.  In fact, it is not clear that there are
any reasonable’ parameters for the exponential utility; this utility function has the odd
property that negative consumption while young is not only possible, but also no disaster.
 A utility function that would imply that the transfer between generations should be
defined in fixed real terms would have the younger generation infinitely less concerned with
income fluctuations than is the older generation:
2My use of the term “monetized” is different from usual in economics, since the units still will
have to be translated into money by the clearing house for transactions.
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U ' u(co ) % cy
where u(co) is concave, while U depends linearly on cy.  With this utility function, young
people are again not particularly concerned with the possibility of negative consumption.
It is hard to imagine why there should be such a sharp distinction between the attitudes
toward poverty of the young and old.
This simple overlapping generations model deals only with transfers between
generations.  But, the basic principles that it illustrates can obviously be extended to other
models.  Just as there is an advantage, in defining a social security system, in tying payments
to incomes, there will be an advantage, in defining all sorts payments specified in long-term
contracts to income-indexed units of account.
Monetized Indexed Units of Account
As indexed units of account become more and more accepted, there may come a day when
institutions are developed so that all prices or incomes are denominated in terms of indexed
units of account, and all exchanges made in terms of the units.  I will call the units in such
an arrangement monetized indexed units of account, since, though they are not really money,
they have the appearance of money in that all transactions are made in terms of the units.2
Today, in contrast to Newcomb’s or Fisher’s day, the use of indexed units of account
could be made so easy, by use of debit card, credit card, or electronic transfer systems, that
the presence of the medium of exchange itself might become virtually invisible to most
people.  Money might be seen only in the account balances representing the individual’s
cash budget constraint, but even these balances can be translated daily into indexed units of
account.  Money may then have importance only for account balances and at the clearing
house for transactions.
The question arises:  how can the price or income index then be computed that defines
the indexed unit of account?  One may be concerned whether it is then possible to define a
price or income index that could be the basis of an indexed unit of account if all prices are
quoted in terms of the same unit.
This concern appears to be misplaced.  There is no problem in defining a consumer price
index or an income index in terms of money, the ultimate medium of exchange, even if all
prices or incomes are specified in terms of an indexed unit of account.  Because the money
equivalent of the indexed unit of account at time t is known at time t, based as it is on lagged
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information, the prices or incomes quoted in terms of the indexed units of account can
always be converted into money terms.  Therefore, the consumer price index or income
index can always be computed.
One may then wonder, how are changes in the supply of or demand for money, the
medium of exchange, going to find their way into the price level, if all prices are specified
in terms of indexed units of account?  Here again, there appears to be no cause for concern.
Whenever there is an excess supply of medium of exchange, for example, the immediate
effect should be an increase in some prices expressed in terms of the indexed units of
account.  Those prices that are relatively less sticky should be affected first.  Their price rise
should then cause an increase in the price or income index, which will then effectively
communicate the price increases to the currency value of the indexed unit of account itself.
Ultimately, as the consumer price index or income index moves towards its new equilibrium
value, these less sticky indexed unit of account prices can return to their original values, all
the adjustment being taken account of by the exchange rate between the indexed unit of
account and the currency.  An example of such an adjustment process is given in Shiller
(1997a).
Defining Indexed Units of Account for the United States
A table defining two indexed units of account, units which I call Units of Price (UP) and
Units of Income (UI), for the United States, giving their conversion into US dollars, is now
available on a daily basis on my web site, http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/uf-usa4.html.
Both are based on government statistics, so that the underlying data are likely to be available
for the foreseeable future.  Since the formulas defining the units (formulas used to construct
the tables there) are also provided on my web site, these would appear to be usable indexed
units of account at the present time.  It is of course unlikely that many people will use my
units.  I present them here by way of illustration and example, with the hope that the US
government will someday define such units.
The unit of price is based on the US consumer price index, and this unit of account is
closely analogous to the Chilean UF.  This unit might be used to price houses, rents, catalog
items, and other items that sell slowly.  Pricing in terms of the unit of price means that the
price would stay roughly constant relative to a broad market basket of consumer items.
The unit of income is based on growth corrected per capita personal income.  The
growth correction divides the per capita personal income by a growth trend line.  The
growth correction is included here to deal both with possible upward biases in the index as
a measure of individual income growth, and to deal with the psychological resistance to
nominal wage cuts, see Shiller (1997a).  This unit might be used, for example, to specify
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annuity or mortgage payments, or for labor contracts.  Specifying payments in terms of the
unit of income assures that the payments will be roughly a constant fraction of per capita
personal income.
Of the two indexed units of account that I have discussed, the unit of price, tied to a
consumer price index as in Chile, rather than to the unit of income, might be most readily
acceptable by the public.  There is widespread public appreciation of the importance of
inflation, and so the public needs much less convincing when the index is tied to the usual
measure of inflation, the consumer price index.  That an income index may also be used for
much the same purpose may be not so obvious to many people.  There appears to be less
public appreciation of real national income variations through than there is to inflation
variations through time.  Still, it seems likely that if the two units of account are introduced
together, and if people see these two as parallel alternatives, that substantial numbers of
people will find ample reason to use the unit of income in appropriate circumstances.
Conclusion
Governments of all nations of the world should create indexed units of account for their
citizens.  It is virtually costless for them to do so.  All the governments need do is decide on
a price and income index, decide on a smoothing method, begin publishing daily values for
the unit of account in terms of currency, and make some commitment that the index will
continue to be calculated on a consistent basis, and without future freezes or other
interference.  It is possible, also, that the indexed unit of account could be created by some
other agency that can commit to continuing to produce the index in the indefinite future (as
in Brazil where production of the consumer price index has been privatized after concerns
were expressed about government mishandling of the statistics).  Still, some government
involvement in establishing the index is probably important for its success.  The introduction
of the units of account might also be accompanied by policies encouraging the creation of
institutions, such as debit cards, credit cards and checking accounts, that are designed to
facilitate quoting everyday prices in terms of the units of account.
To summarize briefly the arguments given above for indexed units of account, one
might say that the creation of indexed units of account may be considered as similar in a
sense to the creation of daylight savings time, (although the units of account are likely to be
much more important in economic significance).  Technically speaking, if everyone were
perfectly “rational,” there would be no need to set our clocks back forward one hour in the
summer; we could all just decide to get up an hour earlier.  But, we know that will never
happen.  One reason it will never happen is that there is a coordination problem in getting
people to start their business an hour earlier.  Coordination problems appear if people in
some workplaces arrive at work earlier and the people in other workplaces with which they
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deal do not.  By analogy, people could just decide to raise all deferred payments in keeping
with inflation, just as they could decide all to get out of bed an hour earlier, but if some do
this and some do not, or if some use one price index formula and some use another, then
there will be a coordination problem here too.  There is also another advantage of daylight
savings time that goes beyond the coordination problem.  There is the problem of human
habit, of looking at the clock and unthinkingly deciding that it is time to do this or that.  The
advantage to daylight savings time, rather than making a collective decision to do everything
an hour earlier in the summer, very plainly has something to do with the persistence of such
habits.  The same advantage is created by indexed units of account.  Just as there was
apparently no collective decision to change times of most daily activities seasonally in the
years before daylight savings time, the alternative to the indexed units of account is really
lack of consistent indexation, and, probably, no indexation at all. and with no indexation,
the ability to make long-term contracts itself will suffer.
The alternative to the indexed units account is essentially the same system of fiat money
and nominal pricing and contracts that most of the world has experienced ever since the
1930s.  This system, while it has not been a disaster, has an absurd quality to it.  People
make contracts in terms of pieces of paper whose value is ultimately decided by political
bodies with vague instructions to promote the general welfare, and on whom political
pressures have in the past resulted in the abandonment of concern for the real value of those
pieces of paper.  There is normally no legal recourse for people who are owed money if the
real value of the amounts owed is wiped out.  Such a system would appear to have been
invented by a prankster, who wanted to keep surprising people and stirring up discontent.
In viewing the deindexation proposals, one wonders, why would anyone want to return to
such a system?
The current move towards deindexation in many countries that had formerly
experienced hyperinflation is perhaps motivated in part by the feeling that the indexation
was a palliative introduced to deal with an extreme crisis.  Now that the crisis is past, it may
be reassuring to many to see the indexation ended.  I think that the history of the
development of indexation, and of the indexed units of account in particular, should have
another interpretation.  The indexation and the indexed units of account were indeed begun
in times of great stress, but the same is true of many other great innovations.  (Daylight
savings time, for example, was introduced during World War I, as an effort to deal with a
wartime energy shortage.)  We may view it as a blessing from the otherwise stressful time
that such innovations are created, and we should not consider that the indexation should be
dismantled in times of lower inflation.  The reason the United States does not have much
indexation, and has never experienced the indexed units of account, for example, is that it
has never, in modern experience, had the experience with high inflation that might have
3That is, the United States has not had really high inflation since the Revolutionary War in the late
eighteenth century. It is interesting to note the very first indexed bond issue in world history occurred
in the United States in 1780; see W. Fisher (1913a).
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shaken it from its complacency about nominal contracting.3
Table 1
Simulated optimal fixed real transfers (capped at 70% of income) from young to old
as fraction of expected income and welfare loss from maintaining capped fixed real transfers
instead of income-related transfers in overlapping generations model





Source:  Author’s monte carlo simulation as described in text, assuming a coefficient of relative
risk aversion of 3.00, with zero subjective discount rate, and an iid log normal distribution for
generational incomes, with zero mean and standard deviation shown.
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Figure 1.  Annual Inflation Rate in percent (based on Consumer Price Index) in Chile, annual data,
1960–1996.  A Indicates date where UF was created, B indicates approximate date where UF became
widely used. Log scale is used on vertical axis.
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